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If it isn’t pleaded, you can’t consider it. That in a nutshell appears to be the 
holding established recently by the Singapore High Court in Kempinski Hotels SA 
v PT Prima International Development [2011] SGHC 171 (“Kempinski”). That 
case saw the setting aside of three related international arbitration awards on the 
basis that the tribunal had gone beyond the scope of matters submitted to it by 
making a decision based on an issue not formally pleaded. 
Facts and Decision 
The applicant (Kempinski Hotels) was a Swiss company which contracted to 
manage a hotel of the respondent (an Indonesian company called PT Prima) in 
Jakarta. The Indonesian Ministry of Tourism subsequently issued three decisions 
requiring the contract to be performed by an Indonesian company. Although 
certain proposed amendments to the contract were then raised between the 
parties, no amendments were effected nor did Kempinski Hotels change the 
entity operating the hotel to an Indonesian company. 
After some time, following an alleged material breach by Kempinski Hotels, PT 
Prima purported to terminate the contract and Kempinski Hotels commenced 
SIAC arbitration proceedings in 2002 alleging wrongful termination. The contract 
was governed by Indonesian law. PT Prima defended the legality of its 
termination and also mounted counterclaims for alleged breaches of contract by 
Kempinski Hotels. 
The tribunal, consisting of a sole arbitrator, released its first award relating to the 
effect of the Ministry’s decisions, by holding, inter alia, that the contract remained 
valid but had become incapable of performance in the manner stipulated. 
Following cross-examination of each party’s experts and written submissions, the 
tribunal released a second award. The second award held that there were 
alternative methods of performance consistent with the Ministry’s decisions. 
Consequently, any supervening illegality did not necessarily bar Kempinski 
Hotels from bringing a claim for damages if Kempinski Hotels could show that the 
contract was wrongfully terminated. 
According to PT Prima, after the release of the second award, it learned that 
Kempinski Hotels had, prior to the release of the second award, entered into a 
 
 
 
new management venture, in full compliance with the Ministry’s decisions, to 
provide hotel management services in respect of another hotel located within a 
one mile vicinity of PT Prima’s hotel. PT Prima wrote to the tribunal to seek 
clarification on the first and second awards in light of this information. The 
tribunal held a conference to decide how the arbitration should proceed. 
After the conference, the tribunal directed Kempinski Hotels to provide specific 
disclosure on four questions concerning the new management venture. 
Kempinski Hotels issued its response to those queries. The tribunal made 
another order directing Kempinski Hotels to disclose certain information relating 
to the new management venture. Kempinski Hotels stated that the new venture 
was irrelevant to the issue of liability in respect of PT Prima’s termination of the 
contract and sought directions for the further conduct of the arbitration. 
Thereafter, the tribunal directed written submissions on the disposition of the 
dispute to be tendered. The tribunal subsequently published its third award. It 
held that (a) the new management venture was inconsistent with the contract; (b) 
the methods of performance that remained open after the Ministry’s decisions 
were no longer possible; and (c) the possibility of damages remained for the 
period between the date of alleged termination of the contract and the date the 
methods of performance ceased being possible. The tribunal requested 
submissions on damages. 
PT Prima duly filed the relevant submissions. Kempinski Hotels took out 
proceedings before the Singapore High Court to set aside the third award 
instead. Thereafter, PT Prima requested the tribunal to make its determination on 
the issues of damages payable. Kempinski Hotels’ submissions however did not 
contain any argument on damages. 
The tribunal issued a fourth award holding that, because no steps were taken to 
make performance of the contract lawful, an award of damages to Kempinski 
Hotels was not possible. The arbitrator also made a costs awards after 
requesting for submissions on costs. Kempinski Hotels took out similar 
proceedings to set aside the fourth and costs awards as well. 
Before the Singapore High Court, Kempinski Hotels sought to set aside the 
awards on five grounds and failed on all but a pleading point which forms the 
focus of this note. 
The learned Judge’s reasoning can be summarized as follows. Art 34(2)(a)(iii) of 
the Model Law (set out in the First Schedule of Singapore’s International 
Arbitration Act) provides that an arbitration award can be set aside when the 
matters decided by the tribunal were beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration. To determine whether matters in an award were within or outside the 
scope of submission to arbitration, a reference to pleadings would usually have 
to be made. An arbitrator is bound to decide the case in accordance with the 
 
 
 
parties’ pleadings, and the arbitrator is not entitled to go beyond the pleadings 
and decide on points which the parties have not given evidence or submissions. 
 
Comment 
 
A question of prejudice 
Two questions can be posed. We start with the more intuitive question: what was 
the prejudice to Kempinski Hotels here? 
If one accepts — as alluded to by the learned Judge — that pleadings exist to 
permit no surprises on the relevant issues so as to allow a party proper 
opportunity to meet the case against it, intuitively it is difficult to see where the 
surprise or prejudice to Kempinski Hotels was in this case. 
After the issue of the new management venture was raised by PT Prima and the 
Tribunal had made directions for specific disclosure on that issue, the parties 
tendered not one but two rounds of submissions and one round of further expert 
opinions before the Tribunal published its third award. That must have given 
Kempinski Hotels ample opportunity to ventilate its position concerning the new 
management venture, even if the matter had only surfaced after the first award 
was published. 
Indeed if PT Prima’s raising of the new management venture had caught 
Kempinski Hotels by surprise, the learned Judge would have simultaneously 
found a breach of natural justice by the tribunal for failing to give Kempinski 
Hotels a proper opportunity to meet the case against it. Yet far from contending 
so, one of Kempinski Hotels’ complaints concerning natural justice was that the 
tribunal had failed to consider Kempinski Hotels’ defences relating to the new 
management venture. Implicit in this submission is an admission that the 
opportunity to raise arguments concerning the new management venture was 
given and was taken. 
The aim of having pleadings needs little introduction: pleadings define the issues 
to give the other party fair notice of the case which it has to meet and also enable 
the relevancy and admissibility of evidence to be determined. The importance of 
proper pleadings is undeniable. But in so far as fair notice had already been 
given and taken by the tendering of multiple rounds of submissions, having the 
result of a case turn on the precise state of pleadings may be, as other 
authorities have vividly noted, putting the cart before the horse. That must be so, 
whether in litigation or arbitration. 
A question of principle and practice 
 
The second question that can be posed is: can it be said that the new 
management venture falls within the scope of matters submitted to arbitration? 
 
 
 
The Court of Appeal in CRW cited its earlier decision in PT Asuransi Jasa 
Indonesia (Persero) v Dexia Bank SA [2007] 1 SLR(R) 597 (“Asuransi”) for the 
two-stage assessment the court has to embark upon when considering Art 
34(2)(a)(iii). Specifically, the court has to determine: 
(a) first, what matters were within the scope of submission to the arbitral 
tribunal; and 
(b) second, whether the arbitral award involved such matters, or whether it 
involved “a new difference … outside the scope of the submission to arbitration 
and accordingly … irrelevant to the issues requiring determination”. 
Art 34(2)(a)(iii) — with the specific expression “submission to arbitration” used 
therein — traces its lineage back to Art V(1)(c) of the New York Convention and 
Art 2(c) of the 1927 Geneva Convention. The report of the Drafting Committee of 
the New York Convention explained that: 
“the expression ‘submission to arbitration’ was used in a broad sense, and was 
intended to include not only an arbitration clause in a contract, but also a 
specific ‘compromis’”. (emphasis added) 
This could be read to mean that a matter is properly within the scope of 
arbitration as long as it falls within an arbitration clause in a contract or 
a compromis (which can be defined for present purposes as a submission 
agreement to arbitrate after a dispute arises). A literal reading of the equally 
authentic French text of the New York Convention supports this reading. When 
literally translated, the French text catches “a difference not contemplated by the 
submission agreement or not falling within the terms of the arbitral clause”. If one 
applies a literal reading of the French text of the New York Convention to the 
present case, there appears to be nothing to suggest that the arbitration 
agreement in this case precluded the tribunal from considering the new 
management venture. 
Nonetheless, it has been suggested that if such a reading of Art V(1)(c) was 
intended, the Drafting Committee would have simply used the expression 
“arbitration agreement” which it used in Art V(1)(a) of the New York Convention, 
instead of the expression “submission to arbitration”. Most authors agree that this 
means that if tribunals deal with matters not falling within the questions submitted 
to the tribunal (also known as the tribunal’s mandate), that would be caught by 
Art V(1)(c) as well. It is suggested here that this view is consistent with the 
consensual nature of arbitration. Parties can confer a mandate on the tribunal 
that delimits the issues submitted to arbitration in spite of the presence of an 
existing arbitration agreement, and there is no reason why the law should deny 
binding effect to that mandate any less than an arbitration agreement. 
 
 
 
In arbitral practice, the matters submitted for arbitration can be gleaned from 
various documents, such as the equivalent of a Notice of Arbitration, the 
equivalent of a Response to the Notice of Arbitration, a Terms of Reference, and 
of course, the pleadings. The ICC Terms of Reference for instance requires a list 
of issues to be set out unless the arbitral tribunal considers it inappropriate. It is 
commonplace for a ICC tribunal and parties to set out a list of issues but to 
include a statement that the list of issues will be subject to review and 
modification in accordance with the parties’ submissions. In like vein, the ICC 
Practical Guide for the drafting of Terms of Reference suggests adding the 
following reservation: 
The issues to be determined shall be those resulting from the 
parties’ submissions and which are relevant to adjudication of the parties’ 
respective claims and defenses. In particular, the Arbitral Tribunal may have to 
consider the following issues (but not necessarily all of these, and only these, 
and not in the following order…). [emphasis added] 
This approach of having regard to the parties’ submissions as they develop 
through the course of the arbitral proceedings, rather than the strict state of the 
pleadings, may not sit well with the holding at hand. The holding could permit a 
party to effectively re-open a case based on allegedly deficient pleadings even if 
the particular matter that was not pleaded had already been substantively (and 
many times, exhaustively) argued before the tribunal. 
 
